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Abstract 
In 2012, the large Uljanik shipyard in Pula (Croatia) was finally privatized, as a result of 
pressure from the European Union. The new owners were the workers (and pensioners) 
of the shipyard. History seemed to have come full circle: thanks to ‘privatization’, a 
previously ‘socially owned’ Yugoslav enterprise returned once again into the hands 
of workers. Yet, a closer look reveals that much has changed both on the shop floor 
and in the business strategies of the firm. In this article, we discuss performances of 
transformation relating to the Uljanik shipyard over the period from 1970 to the present, 
drawing on archival research, observations made in Pula and interviews with Uljanik 
workers. The article reveals how workers, managers and state officials understood 
their roles on the stage of this enterprise, and how they interrelated. Various important 
paradoxes relating to the ‘transformation’ from Yugoslav self-management to self- 
managed capitalism are revealed in the process. These experiences help to explain the 
difficulties in restructuring shipbuilding in Croatia today. 
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Introduction 
On 11 December 1991, six months after Croatia’s independence, Glas Istre, the regional 
newspaper of the Istrian Peninsula ran the headline ‘The Shipyard That Feeds the Town’. 
On the occasion of the 135th anniversary of the founding of the Uljanik shipyard in Pula, 
this newspaper called Uljanik ‘the main wheel of Pula’s and Istria’s economy’. It also 
asked local inhabitants what they thought about the ongoing changes at the shipyard. At 
that time, the beginning of the transformation, significant changes as well as ‘numerous 
rationalizations of jobs and workers’ were imminent. One citizen responded in a way that 
many Uljanik workers and managers (Uljanikovci), would surely have found pleasing: 
I am in shipping, and in our industry, we mention the name of the shipyard in Pula often with 
pride. In the world people take notice of the name ‘Uljanik’. This is a crucial enterprise that 
feeds this city and beyond.1 
Another citizen commented on the incipient ownership transformation of the 
enterprise: 
The fact that ‘Uljanik’ has been transformed into a joint stock company is of course positive 
and should be made public as soon as possible. However, I do not know whether the workers 
will have the money to buy shares. Besides, people have no idea what shares are. They have 
heard about them in American movies and TV series such as ‘Dallas’ and ‘Dynasty’, seeing that 
profits might come from shares. But what will happen if someone puts in their money for five 
years, when that person likely wants to sell their shares? Or if ‘Uljanik’ fails, then also the 
shares? It is likely that today many are not conscious that such an investment also means a 
particular risk.2 
Indeed, long cherished business practices were up in the air, during a time of political and 
economic upheaval. In the same year, the international consulting firm PriceWaterhouse com- 
pleted an assessment of the shipyard, which was one of the largest industrial enterprises of the 
country. PriceWaterhouse came to the candid conclusion that ‘until recently, [Uljanik’s] main 
objectives were employment and social security, whereas profitability was secondary’.3 
These quotes from a turbulent year highlight some of the difficulties and ambiguities 
surrounding the transformation of a shipyard – and indeed any other enterprise – from 
socialism to a market economy. On the one hand, experts, but also ‘ordinary’ citizens, 
were convinced that radical change was required for Uljanik to be able to survive under 
capitalist conditions. This seemed to imply a change in the whole purpose of the enter- 
prise. While it was supposed to continue to do what it had been doing since 1856 – that 
1. ‘Brodogradalište koje hrani grad’, Glas Istre (Pula), 11 December 1991.
2. ‘Brodogradalište koje hrani grad’, Glas Istre (Pula), 11 December 1991.
3. Archive of the (former) Croatian Funds for Privatization (HFP), ‘Uljanik Brodogradilište
Strateški Plan, 1991–1996’. Transl. from the English original ‘Uljanik Shipyard Strategic
Plan for 1991–1996’, PriceWaterhouse/IKO, May 1991. The successor institution of the for- 
mer privatisation funds provided the researchers with a DVD with copies of relevant docu- 
ments. They do not have inventory numbers.
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is, building ships – the objectives of this endeavour were to shift from providing social 
goods to earning money for shareholders. The framework conditions, though, were not 
supportive of ‘restructuring’, as political and economic turmoil reigned: in June 1991, 
Croatia declared independence and became engulfed in war until 1995. The economy 
collapsed after the end of socialism; it took several years to re-establish macroeconomic 
stability and to introduce a new currency, the kuna.4
Over that time, managers and workers at the shipyard faced a set of very diverse, even 
partially contradictory expectations. The overall ideological framework fundamentally 
had changed – ‘market’ and ‘private business’ were the newly dominant catchwords. 
This required interest groups to reformulate their claims so that they made sense under 
the new conditions. At the same time, local policy makers, workers and the public 
expected employment and social goods from the enterprise, and they wanted to continue 
to be proud of their large ship launching ceremonies (porinuće), always a festive affair in 
the city. In this paper we will argue that the language of ‘transformation’ (transformacija) 
provided a useful trope to articulate a diverse set of ideas, claims and agendas, in response 
to external expectations that shipyard practices had to thoroughly change. Yet at the same 
time, local stakeholders proved able to keep the substance of the enterprise’s operations 
as familiar as possible, despite substantial shifts in its form. We argue that these strate- 
gies built on adaptation patterns that the shipyard pursued relating to the wide-ranging 
constitutional changes in 1970s Yugoslavia. The shipyard even tried to bypass certain 
EU demands with the mimicry of transformation, when Croatia was forced to comply 
with European competition rules upon its accession to the EU. Managers and workers 
had learnt to convey a pretence of transformation while at the same time finding ways to 
align local agendas with the ruling ideologies coming out of Belgrade, Zagreb, or 
Brussels. While certain institutional forms and modes of operating did not significantly 
change, macro-conditions and constraints did, resulting in a ‘disinvestment’ in workers 
and, owing to the new conditions of insecurity, an intensification of certain dynamics, 
such as cronyism, that were also present during late socialism. 
Here, then, is a story of transformation and inertia in one of the Adriatic’s leading and 
oldest shipyards.5 It is also a story of muddling through during a time of constant politi- 
cal transformation and often challenging conditions on the world market for ships, for 
which Uljanik produced from the 1960s onwards. ‘Muddling through’ permitted many 
practices to remain very similar under radically different circumstances. It was based on 
alternative frameworks used to judge the success and failure of a business, rather than on 
the numbers at the end of Uljanik’s balance sheet. Workers continue to frame success in 
peculiar ways. Yet this strategy came at a cost: at the time of writing (January 2019), the 
shipyard has been out of money for months, unable to pay its workers, has had contracts 
cancelled and has been deserted by half of its workforce. It seems that this venerable 
shipyard, founded in 1856 by the Austrians as part of their transformation of Pula into the 
main military harbour of the Habsburg Monarchy, may have spent its last, seventh life. 
4. The Croatian kuna was introduced in 1994.
5. The methods drawn on include historical archival research, interview material conducted with
workers and former workers over the period from 2016–2018, and ethnographic observations
during the period of announced ‘restructuring’.
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Socialist-period transformations 
‘Transformation’ (transformacija) was not a new word for Yugoslavia and its successor 
states when they embarked on the rocky road towards capitalism. On the contrary, it was 
a firmly entrenched concept linked to the far-reaching constitutional changes of 1974. 
This association also gave transformacija a not necessarily positive tang: the decentral- 
izing Constitution of 1974 was later widely seen as one of the reasons why Yugoslavia 
broke up. Analysists also pointed to its economic shortcomings because it had initiated 
such a complicated system of self-management that nobody exactly knew anymore how 
the system actually worked.6 
For Uljanik, and other enterprises in Yugoslavia, the 1974 Constitution and the sub- 
sequent Law on Associated Labour (1976) acted as a watershed. The Constitution was 
the longest in the world, indicating its complexity and ambition. The 1976 Law also ran 
to 671 articles.7 Combined, these legal changes fundamentally transformed how busi- 
ness was organized. Yugoslavia entered a new phase of intensified self-management, 
which was introduced on all levels of society. Enterprises as legal entities were dis- 
solved, and the new Constitution did not even mention the word ‘enterprise’ (poduzeće/ 
preduzeće). Instead, production (and administrative tasks) were taken over by so-called 
Basic Organizations of Associated Labour (Serbo-Croatian abbreviation OOUR). In 
1978, there were about 19,000 such OOURs in Yugoslavia. These interacted not accord- 
ing to market principles, but by concluding so-called ‘Self-Management Compacts’. 
For coordination, they could form ‘Work Organizations’ (RO) and on a higher level 
‘Complex Organizations of Associated Labour’ (SOUR). But by law, the important 
decisions had to be taken on the lowest level of organization, that is, the workers’ coun- 
cils at the OOUR. 
Uljanik was now ‘transformed’ into five ROs, organized around the main economic 
activities of the shipyard (such as shipbuilding, engine construction and equipment), 
each of which was constituted of several OOURs. In total, there were 11 (later 12) 
OOURs, all with their own workers’ councils, boards and directors. The whole enterprise 
now worked on the principle of ‘coordinated decentralization’. For that purpose, in 1975, 
the workers’ councils of the 11 OOURs that made up Uljanik established the ‘Complex 
Organization of Labour “Uljanik”’ (SOUR ‘Uljanik’), which was supposed to be the 
coordinating unit between them.8 The business association ‘Jadranbrod’, in which the 
major Yugoslav shipyards participated and which was supposed to coordinate the indus- 
try and represent its interests, also ‘transformed’ and became self-managed.9 
Publicly, the director of Uljanik, Karlo Bilić, spoke of ‘the great advantages produced 
by  the  constitutional  transformation  of  the  collective’.10   The  reorganization  also 
6. Carl-Ulrik Schierup, Migration, Socialism and the International Division of Labour
(Aldershot, 1990); Marie-Janine Calic, ‘The Beginning of the End – The 1970s as a Historical
Turning Point in Yugoslavia’, in Marie-Janine Calic, Dietmar Neutatz and Julia Obertreis,
eds., The Crisis of Socialist Modernity. The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in the 1970s
(Göttingen, 2011), 66–86.
7. John Lampe, Yugoslavia as History. Twice There Was a Country (Cambridge, 1996), 310.
8. ‘Uspjesi na svim poljima. ‘Uljanik’ u 1974. godini’, Brodograditelj, 26 December 1974.
9. ‘Transformacija‚ Jadranbroda‘ koristi svima’, Brodograditelj, 3 December 1974.
10. ‘Uljanik u potrazi za poslom’, Glas Istre (Pula), 24–25 December 1976.
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provided manifold opportunities for the League of Communists and the trade union to 
re-assert their importance in the shipyard, whereas they had been largely marginalized in 
the years before. Uljanik’s communists promised to promote the ‘further transformation’ 
of Uljanik on the basis of the Constitution.11 The trade union stressed that it was ‘directly 
included in the important activity of the transformation of Jadranbrod and Uljanik, and 
through that, in the further establishment of OOURs’.12 In the eyes of the Constitution’s 
authors, workers’ self-management gained a new quality – but what this transformation 
would mean for doing business remained to be seen. The company newspaper, Uljanik, 
for example, often vaguely spoke of ‘further’ transformation without making clear what 
that would entail. 
What soon became clear was the detrimental effect on the organization of the ship- 
yard’s work, which depended on the smooth integration of different, complex tasks. 
The new rules increased transaction costs and led, as a leading newspaper put it, to 
‘insufficient’ and ‘un-synchronized’ cooperation.13 For Uljanik, and other Yugoslav 
shipbuilders, such a major organizational transformation could not have come at a 
worse time: these were the years when global demand for new ships was in free fall 
following the oil price shock of 1973. In 1976, the worldwide annual volume of new 
orders was 46 per cent of the 1974 level.14 Between 1978 and 1991, world output was 
less than half of the 1974 level and did not grow consistently until 1989–90.15 Many 
customers cancelled orders, even though they had to pay high penalties, or refused to 
accept deliveries. The second oil price shock of 1979–80 reduced demand for new 
ships once again. 
Yugoslavia’s shipbuilding was hard hit – in the preceding years it had turned almost 
exclusively to exports, with the highest export share among all major shipbuilding 
nations at that time (up to 100 per cent between 1969 and 1978). Now, new orders sank 
from 2 million dwt in 1973 to 236,000 in 1978. Uljanik, which only built for exports, saw 
its markets drying up. In the late 1960s it had begun to build large tankers of up to 
265,000 dwt, which now proved to be totally obsolete (and had always brought losses 
anyway). From 1975, there is a long paper trail in the archive of the Executive Council 
of the Parliament (Sabor) of the Socialist Republic of Croatia showing near constant, and 
increasingly desperate, efforts to find a solution for Yugoslav shipbuilding.16 Shipbuilders 
asked for cheaper credit and higher export subsidies, claiming that other countries sup- 
ported their industry much more (and omitting the inconvenient fact that government 
help in Europe and Japan came with the substantial downsizing of capacity). 
11. ‘Savez komunista angažiran u svim značajnim pitanjima u kolektivu’, Uljanik, No. 1 (January
1976), 4.
12. ‘Sindikat u duhu Ustava’, Uljanik, No. 1 (January 1976), 8.
13. ‘Pucaju zidovi koji su zaklanjali vidike’, Novi list (Rijeka), 18–19 October 1980; ‘Teškoće
savladati vastitim snagama’, Novi list, 13 November 1980.
14. Hugh Murphy, ‘Appendix 1: The Effects of the Oil Price Shocks on Shipbuilding in the
1970s’, in Raquel Varela, Hugh Murphy, and Marcel van der Linden, eds., Shipbuilding and
Ship Repair Workers Around the World. Case Studies 1950–2010 (Amsterdam, 2017), 665–
673; at 667.
15. Anthony Slaven, British Shipbuilding 1500–2010. A History (Lancaster, 2013), 212.
16. Croatian State Archive, Zagreb [hereafter HDA], Izvršno vjeće sabora (Executive Council of
the Sabor), f. 280.
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Yugoslav non-aligned foreign policies also helped to find new markets, especially 
in the developing world and the Soviet Union. Yet trade with the Soviets came with a 
major disadvantage: they did not pay in hard currency, but pursued either clearing 
trade, or bartered. In both cases, Uljanik would eventually earn only Yugoslav dinars, 
but they had to purchase a lot of equipment for these orders with hard currency from 
Western suppliers. While orders from the Soviet Union helped to keep the shipyard’s 
capacity busy and its workers employed, they did not result in profits, which Yugoslav 
enterprises were actually supposed to earn. Business with developing countries was 
not easy either, as they often paid in kind (or not at all), such as bananas from Ecuador 
and cotton from Sudan, which hardly helped the difficult financing of newly built 
ships. The government, however, made it clear that these deals should go forward for 
political reasons. 
As a result, from the late 1970s, Uljanik was in almost constant financial distress. It 
and the other shipyards repeatedly asked the government for emergency support because 
they ran out of money and could neither pay suppliers nor workers. When, for example, 
a Sudanese shipping line failed to pay Uljanik for three ships at the end of the 1970s, the 
shipyard became illiquid and had its bank account blocked for months in 1980. The 
obvious ‘solution’ would be to reorient shipbuilding towards the domestic market. For 
that purpose, government, shipbuilders and shipping lines signed an agreement in June 
1976, in the Slovenian coastal town of Piran. The Piran Agreement turned into a quix- 
otic effort, as only a tiny fraction of the envisioned ships for domestic purchasers were 
built. The problem was that the banks refused to cover the 30–35 per cent price differ- 
ence between Yugoslav ships and those commissioned abroad. Yugoslav shipbuilding 
struggled, for example, with overpriced domestic inputs that the government forced 
them to purchase.17
So, Uljanik continued to build ships mainly for export. Its representatives used their 
export prowess as one of their main arguments vis-à-vis the government in their search 
for help. Shipbuilding was the most export-oriented sector of Yugoslavia’s industry and 
earned much needed hard currency, so the argument went.18 They described shipbuilding 
as the final producers (finilizator) at the end of a long supply chain, which used the sup- 
plies of many other Yugoslav producers, and in so doing, helping them to export as well. 
The reference to US dollars earned abroad became totemistic because often prices were 
lower than production costs at a time when shipbuilding was a buyer’s market. 
Disregarding this fact, Yugoslav shipbuilders continued to expand capacity and briefly 
climbed to third place in newly ordered tonnage worldwide (around six per cent) at the 
end of 1986.19 Capacity expansion became another good argument with which to pres- 
sure the government. In 1987, when Uljanik’s bank accounts were frozen once again, the 
management pointed out that more than 8,000 employees depended on the shipyard, as 
well as ‘6,000 sub-contractors (kooperanti) and at least as many employees in social 
17. Michael Palairet, ‘Croatian Shipbuilding in Crisis. 1979–1995’, in Srećko Goić, ed.,
Enterprise in Transition. Preceedings. Fourth International Conference on Enterprise in
Transition, Split-Hvar, May 24–26, 2001 (Split, 2001), CD-Rom, 758–818.
18. ‘Brodogradnja inzistira na sistemskim izmjenama’, Glas Istre (Pula), 10 July 1975.
19. ‘Godina iskušenja’, Brodogradnje, 35, No. 1 (1987), 5.
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services’ in Pula that received substantial funds from the shipyard.20 As Uljanik’s then 
director succinctly noted, socialism did not know how to dissolve large systems.21
However, even under conditions of ‘soft budgetary constraints’ (pace János Kornai), 
entailing that the state would ultimately always bail out a failing company, survival did 
not come automatically. In Yugoslavia there were enterprises that went out of business 
during socialism. Furthermore, Uljanik still had to build and sell ships, and these ships 
should not sink – actually, the shipyard was known for producing good quality, purpose 
built ships. Apart from the government’s willingness to inject money, another reason for 
such resilience was the management’s decisions. It performed a mimicry of self-manage- 
ment ‘transformation’ while operating as an enterprise. The difficult international market 
environment also provided them with justifications to bend official rules. 
In 1978, one could read in the enterprise magazine that ‘the constitutional transforma- 
tion is still in progress’.22 In July 1980, the SOUR ‘Uljanik’, gained a new director, Karlo 
Radolović, previously deputy director and an able manager. Radolović re-established a 
strong, decision-making role for the SOUR and reduced the autonomy of the OOURs.23 
He decided that it was only up to the SOUR to negotiate new contracts for ships, and that 
there should be only one provisioning department. If an OOUR did not want to join the 
contract, the SOUR would seek an alternative provider of the same service on the market 
(which were usually even cheaper). Under this threat, the Basic Organizations of 
Associated Labour at the shipyard always fell in line. They knew that there were no 
alternative customers for their products and services but their parent organization. 
Decision making was clearly concentrated in the executive board of the SOUR (poslovni 
odbor) and the management dominated the workers’ council. The number of meetings of 
workers’ labour councils was reduced as well. The director even managed to impose 
overtime and cancelled vacations for the completion of orders for the Soviets without 
significant protests from the trade union or workers’ councils. With such a streamlined 
organization, Uljanik managed to build on average six ships per year in the 1980s and to 
increase its annual export earnings to 200 million USD.24 But they also continued to lose 
money. 
Another survival strategy was the shipyard’s insistence on evaluating its performance 
in terms of its contribution to the well-being of its workers and the larger community and 
not ‘only’ in terms of profits. In the second half of the 1970s, for example, Uljanik paid 
substantial contributions to 16 different public welfare organizations, ranging from pen- 
sion and health coverage, sports and education, to voluntary fire fighters and the recon- 
struction of local roads.25 The shipyard also provided vital infrastructure for social life in 
20. ‘Blokirani navozi’, Glas Istre, 29 October 1987.
21. ‘Prenosimo’  [Interview  with  Karlo  Radolović  in  the  magazine  Start,  31  May  1986],
Brodogradnje, 34, No. 3 (1986), 178.
22. ‘U »Uljaniku« je tek oko svaki drugi radnik nagrađen prema stvarno izvršenom radu’, Uljanik,
No. 24 (May 1978), 5.
23. See Palairet, ‘Croatian Shipbuilding in Crisis. 1979–1995’, 777.
24. ‘Prenosimo’, Brodogradnje, 178–9.
25. ‘Koliko odvajamo za SIZ-ove. Materijal za raspravu na zborovima’, Uljanik, No. 6 (June
1976), 4.
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the City of Pula, such as sports clubs and sport facilities, a punk and rock club, a pension- 
ers’ club, and so forth. Not least, it owned more than 2,700 apartments, many of them in 
houses built by ‘Uljanik Standard’. 
The performance of a ‘socialist enterprise’, hence, has to be evaluated against the 
backdrop of the political and public expectations. While the state wanted the enterprise 
to earn money, the local government and public were more interested in its welfare func- 
tion. This, of course, weighed heavily on the balance sheet of the enterprise but provided 
the management with immense social and political capital. Uljanik made itself indispen- 
sable for Pula, which in turn motivated local policy makers to vigorously lobby for their 
‘giant’ as the single most important employer in the city was often called. At the begin- 
ning of 1979, when Uljanik suffered from illiquidity, the Municipal Council of Pula sent 
a dispatch to the government of Croatia: 
The difficult situation of ‘Uljanik’ (50% of the proceeds of the municipality) heavily reflects on 
the situation of the whole economy and also the non-economic life and situation of our 
community. We expect a swift resolution of this problem with the objective to improve the 
conditions for the activity of the shipbuilding enterprise ‘Uljanik’ and shipbuilding as a whole, 
which is an important export industry.26
The government and public accepted that shipbuilding was of ‘vital interest for the whole 
country’, as an official report declared in 1983.27 This line of argument would prove 
persistent, as it also turned out to be useful after 1990, when communist rule ended. The 
welfare functions and Uljanik’s prideful success on world markets were regularly 
employed by the management and the workers to insist on concessions from the govern- 
ment, which ultimately meant taxpayer’s money. 
Pretending to become private 
‘Transformation’ again became a much used catchword at the end of the 1980s. This time 
it denoted the reorganisation of the shipyard and the change of ownership, in line with 
the overall switch from a socialist economy to a capitalist market economy. In March 
1989, the new Law on Enterprises re-introduced the term ‘enterprise’ (poduzeće) into 
Yugoslavia’s legal system. In July 1989, the by then eight ROs constituting Uljanik 
agreed to form one ‘Complex Firm’ (holding), thus also formally re-centralising deci- 
sion-making and ownership.28 Uljanik was on the road to becoming a ‘normal’ enter- 
prise. At that moment, it employed 8,124 workers.29 
In public and within the firm, one of the main questions was the future form of owner- 
ship. Uljanik was again a firm but still social property, that is, self-managed and without 
26. HDA, Izvršno vijeće sabora, f. 280, kut. 161, br. 7., 9 January 1979.
27. HDA, Izvršno vijeće sabora, f. 280, kut. 263, br. 1181, September 1983.
28. Uljanik  Company Archive  (Pula),  Poslovodni  Odbor,  1989,  3;  Uljanik: Archive  of  the
Croatian Funds for Privatization, Elaborat, br. H001-BR/DV-15/92, 21 February 1992.
29. Archive of the Croatian Funds for Privatization, Elaborat, ‘Izvješće o obavljenoj reviziji pret- 
vorbe i privatizacije’, July 2004.
868 
clear owners. In 1990, the local newspaper regularly reported on the ‘transformation’ of 
ownership, as social ownership in principle had entailed ownership by ‘nobody’, and the 
enterprise should therefore be transformed into shareholders’ associations.30 Another 
article on ‘transformation’ was entitled ‘Nobody’s Must Become Somebody’s’ (Ničije 
mora postati nečije).31 Hence, in public discourse transformacija became closely linked 
with the question of ownership. The fact that the future economic order would be market 
oriented did not provoke any debate at all. Within Uljanik they stated that they had 
already embraced the international market and competitiveness since the mid-1950s. 
The director of Uljanik seized the opportunity to appropriate the reform talk: ‘We at 
Uljanik can be glad about the high degree of viability of our program’; the ‘newest trans- 
formation will open up great opportunities and challenges for the comprehensive develop- 
ment of our firms and for new activities for which all possible forms of ownership shall be 
exploited’.32 On the same occasion, the 134th anniversary of the shipyard, the mayor of 
Pula called the shipyard the ‘business card’ of every citizen of Pula and Istria in the whole 
world. He stressed that the old saying, ‘if Uljanik is doing good, Pula is good, and if Uljanik 
is bad, Pula is bad’ was still true but, on a sour note, he also complained that shipbuilding 
‘was never appreciated enough and systematically integrated into the development strategy 
of our country’.33 Therefore, if there were problems, the government was to be blamed. 
The transformation of ownership would become a long-term project in which there 
was a lot of room for performing reforms while retaining ‘old’ substance. This especially 
meant privatisation, which became the official goal of economic policy making as early 
as under the last Yugoslav government of prime minister Ante Marković. It gained even 
more urgency when the conservative Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) came to power 
in Croatia in 1990. Their ‘general aim was privatisation’, as the director of the Agency 
for Restructuring and Development pointed out in an interview to Glas Istre.34 At that 
time, economists and policy makers agreed that the state should privatise enterprises 
sooner rather than later, as manifest in the 1991 privatisation law.35
The concrete mode of privatisation, though, was contested ‘between advocates of a 
voucher-based mass privatization (similar to the Czech model) and proponents of case- 
by-case sales to investors (as undertaken in Hungary)’.36 President Tuđman appeared to 
prefer the second model because he saw this as an opportunity to sell off property to 
investors close to his party, the HDZ. He was a proponent of ‘national capitalism’, that is 
the economy not being controlled by foreign interests. The moment was unsuitable for a 
30. ‘Društevno vlasništvo treba transformirati u mješovito. Kolektivnim vlasništvo u “novi soci- 
jalizam”’, Glas Istre (Pula), 2 March 1990.
31. Glast Istre (Pula), 10 May 1990.
32. ‘Jubilei “Uljanika”. Pretpostavke novog razvoja’, Glas Istre (Pula), 9 December 1990.
33. ‘Jubilei “Uljanika”. Pretpostavke novog razvoja’, Glas Istre (Pula), 9 December 1990.
34. ‘Hrvatska nije na bubnju’, Glas Istre (Pula), 1 August 1992.
35. ‘Zakon o pretvorbi društvenih poduzeća’, Narodne novine (Zagreb), 23 April 1991.
36. Elizabeth Barrett, ‘The Role of Informal Networks in the Privatisation Process in Croatia’, in
David Lane, Jochen Tholen, and György Lengyel, eds., Restructuring of the Economic Elites
After State Socialism. Recruitment, Institutions and Attitudes (Stuttgart, 2007), 211–40; at
224. 
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systematic privatisation anyway: Croatia not only plunged into a deep recession after the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia, but also into a war that only ended in August 1995. The incon- 
sistent economic policies of president Tuđman and the crony capitalism that emerged 
under his watch did little to attract foreign investors. Under the 1991 privatisation law, 
the government also retained much discretion. Its privatisation agency could reject the 
privatisation plans of companies and force them into state ownership.37 
The ambiguity of privatisation had already been conditioned by the fact that, as a first 
step, the state had actually nationalised most enterprises: in 1991–2, social ownership 
was transferred to state ownership, with the purported goal of privatisation; for that to 
happen, clear ownership titles first had to be established. Uljanik’s workers’ council 
decided to dissolve itself on 30 October 1991, and asked the government for Uljanik to 
be transformed into a joint stock company.38 On 4 April 1992, the Croatian government, 
through its Agency for Restructuring and Development, approved the shipyard’s request. 
Uljanik became a joint stock company, with nominal shares amounting to almost 15 bil- 
lion Croatian dinars (134 million USD). Some 2.2 billion dinars of the joint stock was 
made up of a government subsidy for restructuring.39 
Uljanik also pretended to become private. A Glas Istre article on the occasion of the 
shipyard’s 135th anniversary exclaimed ‘Shareholders instead of Self-Managers’.40 
Indeed, roughly 40 per cent of the shares had been given to almost 6,900 small share- 
holders, mainly workers and pensioners, who enjoyed a discount. The other shares went 
to the Croatian Fund for Development, later called the Agency for Privatization (45 per 
cent) and the state controlled pension and disability funds of workers and farmers.41
What followed proved the quoted citizen from the opening page right: the small share- 
holders would suffer years of agony. Because of the shipyard’s constant losses, they did 
not receive any dividends and could not sell their shares to other private buyers. Most 
small shareholders (6,800) had bought their shares on credit, so they faced years of pay- 
ing back the purchase price in instalments. They also failed to receive proper representa- 
tion on the company’s board. Some of these small shareholders sued the government, 
while others established an association to represent their interests.42
In 1998, when Uljanik faced bankruptcy, their shares became worthless. The Deputy 
Minister of the Economy, Milan Čuvalo, who oversaw the restructuring of shipbuilding, 
pitilessly commented on their fate that ‘nowhere in the world is the socialization of the 
risks of the owners of capital accepted’. The small shareholders should have held the 
management to account earlier, rather than complain now.43 A Glas Istre article on the 
37. Barrett, ‘The Role of Informal Networks’, 229.
38. Archive of the Croatian Funds for Privatization, Elaborat, ‘Radnički savjet: Odluka o pret- 
vorbi “Uljanika”’, 31 October 1991.
39. Archive of the Croatian Funds for Privatization, Elaborat, ‘Rješenje’, br. 302-01/91-01/2891,
4 April 1992.
40. ‘Obilječena 135. godišnjica osnutka “Uljanika”: Dioničari umjesto samoupravljaša’, Glas
Istre (Pula), 10 December 1991.
41. ‘Dioničari dobivaju ugovore’, Glas Istre (Pula), 1 September 1992.
42. ‘Izgrani mali dioničari ‚ “Uljanika”’, Glas Istre (Pula), 24 March 1998.
43. ‘Uljanikove dionice su bezvrijedne’, Glas Istre (Pula), 18 April 1998.
870 
‘naïve’ small shareholders was tellingly titled ‘The Wolf Ate the Uljanik Donkey’.44 In 
the end, the majority of private, small shareholders passed their shares over to the priva- 
tisation agency. By 2000, the proportion held by individual shareholders declined to 15 
per cent, while that of the privatisation agency increased to 73 per cent.45 Instead of 
becoming more private, Uljanik became more state-owned. 
In the meantime, the shipyard management under the long-time director Karlo Radolović 
fought for its survival, which in all but two years of the 1990s lost money. Its short-term 
debt increased from 761 million kuna in 1993 to 3.4 billion in 1999, when the shipyard was 
technically insolvent.46 Since the 1980s there had hardly been any new investment in tech- 
nology and machinery, thereby leading to frequent delays in delivery, resulting in penalty 
payments. No private investor was forthcoming; Uljanik’s survival depended on the gov- 
ernment, which repeatedly injected money. On a couple of occasions during the 1990s, 
Uljanik’s bank accounts were frozen because of outstanding debts. Sometimes the state 
utility provider stopped the delivery of electricity, and hospitals refused to treat Uljanik 
workers because the shipyard had not paid its bills. There were at least eight strikes between 
1992 and 1997 because of wage arrears and low salaries – each of which resulted in the 
immediate payment of wages or their increase. The director’s main strategy, therefore, was 
to keep the government happy. In a 1992 interview, he boasted that: 
If we speak about shipbuilding and the relations of politics towards it, I want to mention that I 
am happy that I could speak several times with president Tuđman and the prime minister. So, I 
think that all our policy makers, and especially those of economic policy, understand the 
significance of Croatian shipbuilding and its trade mark in the world.47 
Radolović knew which arguments to make to the government. He highlighted the impor- 
tance of shipbuilding for the economy of Croatia and especially its export earnings, and 
stressed that it had the potential to employ demobilized soldiers after the end of the war. 
Radolović even joined the HDZ and in 1998 was elected into the city government of Pula 
(despite his famous aversion against speaking in public). He also built on widespread 
support among the public in Croatia for the maintenance of shipbuilding. The reporting 
by Glas Istre indicates that public opinion was convinced of the strategic value and 
future potential of shipbuilding, viewed as one of the few internationally recognized 
trademark industries of Croatia. At the same time, certain ‘restructuring’ measures were 
implemented as well; the workforce was cut from almost 6,000 in 1993 to 3,316 by 
1998.48 Uljanik also successfully employed Croatia’s foreign policy in order to open up 
44. ‘Vuk pojeo Uljanikovo magare’, Glas Istre (Pula), 25 April 1998.
45. Archive of the Croatian Funds for Privatization, Elaborat, ‘Izvješće o obavljenoj reviziji pret- 
vorbe i privatizacije’, July 2004.
46. Archive of the Croatian Funds for Privatization, Elaborat, ‘Izvješće o obavljenoj reviziji pret- 
vorbe i privatizacije’, Table 9.
47. ‘Hrvatska brodogradnja danas. Razgovor s Karlom Radolovićem predsjednikom Uljanika’,
Brodogradnje, 40, Nos. 3–4 (1992), 105.
48. Archive of the Croatian Funds for Privatization, Elaborat, ‘Izvješće o obavljenoj reviziji pret- 
vorbe i privatizacije’, Table 9.
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to new markets, for example in Turkmenistan, for which Uljanik began to build specialist 
ferry boats and carriers for the Caspian Sea. 
Therefore, thanks to continuous state support, a capable management, and resourceful 
workers, Uljanik managed to survive the difficult years, recording a profit in 1999 once 
again, and soon officially leaving state-ordered sanacija (recovery measures). At the 
same time, the enterprise remained majority state-owned. By the mid-2000s, state-owned 
funds or state controlled entities held about 88 per cent of the shares; some belonged to 
utility providers and local self-governing bodies, whose receivables towards Uljanik had 
been transformed into shares.49 The sale of Uljanik-owned apartments to their owners 
also helped to reduce debts. The order books were full again, so pressure to further 
‘transform’ ceased and privatisation was off the agenda – despite the government’s rheto- 
ric to the contrary.50 Uljanik took pride in being the only profitable large Croatian ship- 
yard, quietly overlooking the fact that state subsidies made up at least 10 per cent of the 
contract price of each delivered ship.51 
Enter the EU 
Privatization and renewed transformation surfaced once again when Croatia negotiated 
for membership of the European Union. The EU made it clear that the ownership struc- 
ture of the shipyards at that time, and their dependency on state aid, violated EU compe- 
tition rules; it also contravened the EU’s strategy for the consolidation and increase in 
competitiveness of the sector.52 Shipbuilding was significant for the Croatian economy, 
employing 2.5 per cent of workers and producing 12–15 per cent of Croatia’s exports.53
At the same time, it received hundreds of millions of Croatian kunas of state support 
every year, which is why the European Commission made an important issue of it. 
Hölscher et al highlight that: 
During Croatia’s EU accession negotiations, the shipbuilding industry has been the most critical 
subject in the negotiation chapters on competition and state aid policy. Therefore, the 
Commission required that Croatian shipyards needed to be restructured, privatized, and the 
subsidies to be phased out by the date of accession, 1 July 2013. Otherwise, the Commission 
would order recovery of all aid paid out ever since 2006.54 
Since Uljanik presented itself as a successful enterprise, and the government agreed with 
this standpoint, they managed to convince the European Commission that it could be 
49. Archive of the Croatian Funds for Privatization, Elaborat, ‘Izvješće o obavljenoj reviziji pret- 
vorbe i privatizacije’, Table ‘Vlasnička struktura na dan 31.3.2004’.
50. Archive of the Croatian Funds for Privatization, Elaborat, ‘Predmet: Uljanik d.d., Pula’, br.
563-01-01/02-2009-4, 9 July 2009.
51. Yoji Koyama, ‘Croatia's EU Accession and Challenges Ahead,’ Journal of Comparative
Economic Studies, 9 (2014), 166–7.
52. Koyama, ‘Croatia’s EU Accession’, 166.
53. Željka Tutić, The EU State Aid Rules: The Case of Croatia (Budapest, 2011), 24.
54. Jens Hölscher, Nicole Nulsch and Johannes Stephan, ‘Ten Years after Accession: State Aid in
Eastern Europe’, European State Aid Law Quarterly, 13, No. 2 (2014), 314.
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spared another round of restructuring. Uljanik even bought its long-term competitor in 
Rijeka, the 3rd of May shipyard, for the symbolic price of one Croatian kuna in 2013. 
Uljanik itself promised to become private. Selling the shipyard to an investor was 
opposed by workers and trade unions who feared a loss of jobs. Hence, 20 years after the 
nationalization of the enterprise, Uljanik’s workers suddenly became its main share- 
holder: with the government’s approval in July 1992, more than 1.5 million shares were 
sold with a 20 per cent discount to almost 7,200 individuals, most of whom were (for- 
mer) employees of the shipyard. They now earned 46 per cent of the joint stock, consti- 
tuting the largest single bloc of shareholders. Most of the other shares were held by state 
pension funds, commercial banks and insurance companies, thus businesses closely 
related to the government. The government declared, ‘We successfully accomplished the 
privatization of the Uljanik shipyard’.55 The European Commission approved it.56 
Everything seemed fine: workers were now supposed to be the real owners of the 
shipyard. The order books were filling up nicely again, also because the international 
crisis in shipbuilding, as world trade declined rapidly in the 2008–9 financial crisis, sub- 
sided by the mid-2010s. Uljanik’s decision to specialize in custom-fit ships apparently 
proved correct. In 2013 the Uljanik Group recorded a profit of 103 million kuna (about 
15 million euros). After that, it again recorded losses but they seemed manageable. They 
embarked on some much publicized new projects, such as the first luxury cruise ship for 
polar cruises. But the respite from transformation proved short-lived: at the end of 2017, 
the individual shareholders, the government and the public at large were taken by sur- 
prise when they learnt that the shipyard faced a dramatic illiquidity problem and had 
accrued huge debts. The year ended with a loss of 1.8 billion kunas, almost 250 million 
euros.57 Since then, Uljanik has been fighting – again – for its life. In the following, final 
section, drawing on interviews and fieldwork observations,58 we ask whether workers 
viewed this recent turn of events as a failure, and if so, in what sense? 
A shipyard in crisis 
In mid-January 2018 workers did not receive their monthly wage on time. The shipyard 
management were ‘muddling through’ once again, struggling to pay suppliers punctu- 
ally. They had asked the Croatian government to secure a state guarantee for a 96 million 
euro loan, which would cover the running costs of the firm while ‘restructuring’ plans 
were drawn up and a ‘strategic partner’ found. Looming strike action was narrowly 
55. Radimir Čačić, 'Uspješno smo završili privatizaciju brodogradilišta Uljanik', tvportal,
https://www.tportal.hr/vijesti/clanak/uspjesno-smo-zavrsili-privatizaciju-brodogradilista- 
uljanik-20120726 (accessed 1 February 2019).
56. European Commission, ‘State aid: Commission Approves Changes to Restructuring Plan of
Croatian Shipyard 3 Maj’, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-565_en.htm (accessed
1 February 2019).
57. Uljanik’s financial reports are available (in English) at https://uljanik.hr/en/other-information/
financial-reports.
58. Conducted by Andrew Hodges from March-July 2018.
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avoided as the loan was approved by the European Commission.59 Nevertheless, discon- 
tented workers began to organize and protest against the management’s handling of the 
crisis, and later the shipyard management made a dubious choice of strategic partner – a 
local tycoon named Danko Končar and his company Kermas Energija. Končar is in pos- 
session of a concession to develop the northern part of the Bay of Pula into a luxury 
tourist resort and marina; a fact that many workers viewed as conflicting with the reten- 
tion of large-scale industry in the centre of Pula. In summer 2018, the interim funds ran 
out and once again, Uljanik workers went unpaid. On this occasion a full-blown strike 
took place, both in Pula and at the 3rd May shipyard in Rijeka, part of the same company, 
with striking workers making demands that the Uljanik management resign, and that the 
regional authorities and ultimately the Croatian government take responsibility for, and 
ensure the survival of, the ailing shipyards. Since then, movements have been made in 
this direction, but the medium-term future of the shipyards remains uncertain. 
Success and failure in workers’ narratives 
Narratives of ‘finding a path’ (snalaziti se), of pulling through difficulties (izvući se) and 
of surviving (preživljavanje) all related to responding to new and unpredictable chal- 
lenges and difficulties in a manner specific to the local context. The actions taken by the 
shipyard management may seem irrational from a perspective focused on understanding 
Uljanik as a profit-maximising firm on a market, but they do make sense if understood 
as a form of ‘political entrepreneurialism’60 seeking to maintain relations with the work- 
ers and with key stakeholders in the state bureaucracy. For instance, individuals who 
were skilled at football were purportedly offered jobs at Uljanik simply so they would 
play for the team, as a form of recognition given that the firm’s football team (NK 
Uljanik, seniors) could not pay its players a substantial wage. I also heard stories sug- 
gesting that Uljanik had paid for repairs to the ceiling of a city museum.61
Such activities were not profit-making, nor were they explicitly publicized in a man- 
ner that might be expected had they been completed in a corporate social responsibility 
paradigm, or as engagements in a humanitarian or charity paradigm. Such tales were 
related via gossip and rumour rather than on the company websites, helping to create a 
59. European Commission, ‘State Aid: Commission Clears Rescue Aid for Croatian Shipbuilder
Uljanik’, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-391_en.htm (last accessed 5 September
2018). 
60. This relates to a large literature on political and social relations, and ‘clientelism’. In the
context of entrepreneurialism see: Gil Eyal, Iván Szelényi, Eleanor Townsley, eds., Making
Capitalism Without Capitalists: Class Formation and Elite Struggles in Post-Communist
Central Europe (London, 1998). For key work on ‘political connections’, see Alena Ledeneva,
‘Open Secrets and Knowing Smiles’, East European Politics & Societies, 25, No. 4 (2011),
720–36; Caroline Humphrey, ‘Favors and “Normal Heroes”: The Case of Postsocialist Higher
Education’, HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory, 2, No. 2 (2012), 22–41; Čarna Brković,
Managing Ambiguity: How Clientelism, Citizenship, and Power Shape Personhood (New
York, 2017).
61. This section deals with ethnographic observations and so the first person singular is used to
denote author two.
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good impression of the firm among the local population along more personalized lines, 
therein presenting the firm as part of the net of social relations in Pula. The shipyard was 
part and parcel of the city life and social collective, rather than an external entity to 
which residents related, and which had its own reputation separate from that of the city. 
There was an imprinting of the firm on many non-work aspects of city life, through its 
public presence in the city, and through the various leisure activities. This, coupled with 
Yugoslav self-management, likely led to a deep identification with the firm (‘we 
Uljanikovci’), rather than positioning it as a ‘they’ in which they perceive themselves as 
being in some kind of economic relationship and a social contract. The question of 
whether this identification was a form of fetishism, viewing the company as an animate 
being, or whether it was understood as a series of social relationships in which workers 
collectively participated is an interesting one. One interlocutor described Uljanik as ‘one 
of the last oases of socialism’ before emphasizing how the growth of tourism was nega- 
tively affecting the city, and voicing her view that the imminent restructuring would 
bring a final end to this oasis. 
Pula residents’ metaphor for understanding Uljanik as an entity that ‘fed the city’ 
(hrani grad) suggests the importance of support and provision for workers’ needs as key 
to understandings of success. Many people stressed how practically every household in 
Pula had some kind of connection with Uljanik, and the importance of provision in 
understandings of success was also present in narratives of basic worker expectations, 
such as wages arriving on time: 
Were Uljanik workers proud of being ‘Uljanikovci’? 
Yes. They were proud of being Uljanikovci 
More than in other companies? What do you think? 
More because we never went home without a wage. The wages were always received. (FN)62 
This is particularly relevant given that, especially during periods of crisis, a signifi- 
cant number of firms in Croatia did not pay workers their wages for several months in a 
row. Wage arrears were almost certainly a problem during the late 1980s and the war 
period as well.63 From a worker perspective, I suggest that success could not be equated 
with successful business performance on the market. However, in periods when the firm 
was doing well and workers experienced the fruits of this, this would have compounded 
a sense of success as long as it was not perceived as being at their expense. A keen eye 
was kept on the behaviour of those at the top, with one worker describing how the man- 
ager Radolović was clever in driving an old car, in contrast to one of the union repre- 
sentatives who drove a Mercedes. 
62. Croatian: Da li su radnici u Uljaniku bili ponosni da su Uljanikovci? Jesu. Ponosni su bili na
to da rade u Uljaniku. Više nego u drugim firmama ili što mislite? Više zato što nismo nikad
došli doma bez plaće. Uvijek se plaća dobivala. (FN)
63. This came up in interviews and a third member of our project team, Peter Wegenschimmel,
will in future publish texts on the shipyard during the 1980s.
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Critiques abounded of certain management and political figures as having become 
increasingly distant from the workers in recent years, bound up in wider crony capitalist 
networks of corruption in Croatia. During the ‘restructuring’ period, potential links 
between the management and the regional political party, the IDS (Istrian Democratic 
Assembly) were rumoured with fears that such links entailed the compulsory downsizing 
of the firm and especially of the Arsenal section (located by Pula city centre on the coast), 
with its repurposing for tourism. When respected, as Radolović was, managers were 
viewed as having risen through the ranks on the basis of experience. When critiqued, their 
political connections and ostentatious purchases were emphasized. For example, during 
the August 2018 workers’ strikes, the CEO’s villa was placed under police protection,64 
amidst fears and even threats by some workers that they would cause problems there. 
Finally, as mentioned earlier, the narrative of Uljanik as a ‘world recognized brand’ 
was also present, and that Uljanik was favoured by the Croatian government over other 
industries. Wages had always been relatively high compared to other local industries, 
such as the textile industry, where more women worked.65 The fact that the company 
brought in foreign currency was deemed important, especially during the socialist 
period. The feeling that workers during mid-late twentieth century Yugoslav socialism 
were participating in something that was important and meaningful on a world stage, 
most clearly materialized in the celebrations that accompanied the porinuće (launching 
of a ship following its completion). These celebrations also contributed to feelings of 
meaningfulness and success. In addition, the specific technical expertise of the work- 
force was a particular source of pride: 
We are somewhat proud of those young people who are now managing Uljanik, they nevertheless 
descended from us. And they are engineers, experts, who are the children of our children. And 
I believe they are working very cleverly for Uljanik. (FN) 
Uljanik is generally well-known for its expertise. They have extremely good experts – not only 
now, but good experts for many years running. All the kinds of ships built in the world have 
been built at Uljanik and can be built there even today. All the kinds which are made the world 
over. (KN, 2)66 
64. Barbara Ban, ‘Vila razdora’, Jutarnji vjesti, https://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/ovo- je-
vila-koju-je-celnik-uljanika-dovrsio-u-trenu-kad-se-skver-nasao-pred-slomom-u-spici- 
sezone-vilu-iznajmljuje-za-5000-eura-tjedno/7759194/ (last accessed 16 January 2019); P. 
N., ‘Policija patrolira ispred nove vile’, Novi list, http://www.novilist.hr/Vijesti/Hrvatska/
Policija-patrolira-ispred-nove-vile-Giannija-Rossande.-Otkriven-iznos-njegove-place-i- 
bonusa (last accessed 16 January 2019).
65. See Chiara Bonfiglioli, Women and Industry in the Balkans. The Rise and Fall of the Yugoslav 
Textile Sector (London, 2019).
66. Croatian: Ponosni smo nekako na te mlade ljude koji sada rukovode Uljanikom, da su ipak
potekli od nas. I to su inžinjeri, stručnjaci, koji su djeca naše djece. I vjerujte da u Uljaniku
jako pametno rade. (FN)
Uljanik je inače poznat po stručnosti. Imaju jako dobre stručnjake – ne samo sada, nego niz
godina dobre stručnjake. Sve vrste brodova što se u svijetu grade su se gradile u Uljaniku i
mogu se i dan danas graditi u Uljaniku. Sve vrste što se u svijetu rade.
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This source of pride formed a particularly strong contrast in Pula with tourism. Jobs in 
tourism were widely commented on as requiring less high-level and task-specific skills 
than shipbuilding. While tourism was extremely lucrative for some in Pula, workers 
highlighted that it was an unstable source of income, subject to travel industry whims 
and relative consumer power. Furthermore, in two widely circulating tropes, they stated 
that it would only take an oil spill or a terrorist attack to severely damage tourism income 
levels for several years. 
Finally, within Uljanik, ideas of failure correlated with wider ideas of crisis and of the 
firm not providing for the workers, and as not functioning as a coherent and healthy 
whole: 
Uljanik began as early as in the eighties to stagnate a little. One time there was only a few 
materials, so they contracted for a small number of ships, the market pressure was great and the 
crisis began. Then, a few ships were contracted and so . . . the money was what it was, then one 
ship would be ordered or some material. And then they would be forced to hurry because the 
ships had quick deadlines and weak prices – there were crises here. There were quite a few 
crises during one period. We can say that it really began around ’88-’89 – without work even. 
There was very little work. (KN, 7).67 
In later years, ideas of failure were connected with themes widely discussed in the post- 
Yugoslav region, namely with nepotism and political corruption resulting in money being 
wasted at the shipyard, and tasks not being completed. The disruption of war in the 1990s 
was also viewed by some as having a substantial negative effect, as some workers left to 
fight, or alternatively work in countries such as Italy, and there was an interruption in the 
passing on of technical expertise. Nepotism, where people would employ their friends or 
kin for positions they may not be qualified for, also contested the narrative of expertise. 
This was even discussed in an interview with a welder for the news website index.hr in the 
wake of the crisis, who decided a year ago that he wouldn’t try hard, and nothing changed. 
Some retired, some did this, some did that. . . – but how I see it, the strategic goal was always 
that production. . . it is one thread that goes on, the question is in what ways. . . as the 
management changed. But that was always the one guiding light that was crucial and that is 
why Uljanik always managed to survive, because the main goal was always the production of 
ships (BC, 4). 
Concluding remarks 
We suggest that at the everyday workers’ level, the success of the shipyard was embodied 
in its reliability to provide for workers’ needs in a broader social sense than a satisfactory 
67. Croatian: Uljanik je počeo već u 80tim godinama malo stagnirati. Jedno vrijeme je bilo malo
materijala, pa se malo ugovaralo brodova, bio je pritisak na tržištu veliki i počela je kriza.
Tada, onda bi bilo kad bi se ugovorilo par brodova i tako, . . . novaca je bilo kako je bilo,
onda bi se naručio jedan brod ili dva materijala, pa bi se onda to forsiralo na brzinu jer su
ti brodovi sa kratkim rokovima i sa slabom cijenom – i tu su bile krize. Dosta kriza je jedno
vrijeme bilo. Tako da recimo '88./ '89. tamo je počelo baš – bez posla čak. Jako malo posla je
bilo. (KN, 7).
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or unsatisfactory pay cheque once a month. The better position of the enterprise com- 
pared with many others in the former Yugoslavia, as encoded in the small bonuses, 
employee benefits and higher wages, and evidence of Uljanik’s success in having a 
‘full order book’ was key. For those in middle and higher management positions, the 
cosmopolitanism of the firm and its global positioning likely related to perceptions of 
its success; and for the government the provision of employment in Pula combined 
with Uljanik’s recognition on the world market justified continuing support for the ever- 
struggling shipyard. 
These notions of success, and failure, are rooted in the socialist experience: in 
Yugoslav times, enterprises were supposed to provide welfare, job security, and sociabil- 
ity and to contribute to their community. In the case of Uljanik, success was more often 
than not expressed in the number of ships produced, the net amount of USD earned 
abroad, or the size of its contribution to the budget of the City of Pula, rather than the 
mundane fact of whether the shipyard made profits or not. Like so many other socialist 
enterprises – and like big capitalist firms during the heydays of Fordism – Uljanik was 
an octopus whose tentacles reached out into many arenas of social life. Making itself 
indispensable for the local community was also a form of life insurance. 
Octopuses are also masters of camouflage – Uljanik managed to maintain a surprising 
degree of continuity by pretending to change its form, dependent on changes in the leg- 
islative and ideological frameworks. This led to the emergence of the belief that things 
could stay as they were and that formal adaptation would suffice to meet frequently 
raised demands for ‘transformation’. The long-term unviability of such a strategy had 
already been highlighted in 1979 by a shipbuilding representative in one of the many 
negotiations between the government of Croatia and the federal government in Belgrade 
on the problems of shipbuilding: ‘We always search for ad-hoc solutions, in constant 
danger of the problem persisting and not being solved.’68 
Bearing in mind the social functions of Uljanik, muddling through seemed the best 
strategy at hand in order to reconcile fundamentally irreconcilable demands emanating 
from a transforming political landscape. Uljanik has managed to transpose its under- 
standings of success to very different regimes of political economy, ultimately building 
on the assumption that the government would consider it too important to let it go bust. 
It played to nested assumptions in Croatia about the special place of manufacturing in 
scales of modernity and the priority given to material production in the popular eco- 
nomic value system. In particular, it could build on the widespread notion, eagerly nour- 
ished by the shipyard’s management and workers, that shipbuilding was an indispensable 
element of modernity in Istria and Dalmatia. Only today, it seems, the local government, 
closely connected with powerful business interests, prioritizes other interests, and par- 
ticularly tourism. The ruling IDS party in Istria now tends to consider Uljanik not a 
landmark but as a blemish on Pula’s cityscape, and as an unwelcome leftover of social- 
ism. They purportedly want to see hotels and yachts in Pula’s harbour, instead of the 
emblematic dizalice (cranes) and a half-built, rusting freight carrier for which Uljanik 
failed to find a new purchaser. 
68. HDA, Izvršno vijeće sabora, f. 280, kut. 174, br. 481, 25 May 1979.
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Pressured by workers and the public, the local government in 2018 was once again 
forced to throw their support behind Uljanik, and the national government came to 
Uljanik’s aid as well, ensuring the enterprise’s survival for another year. Yet at the time 
of writing it becomes more unlikely by the day that the shipyard will see its 170th birth- 
day (2026). Twenty years ago an industry representative, then with pride, declared that 
Yugoslavia’s shipbuilding ‘is an integral part of global shipbuilding with which it shares 
the fate of a common market ruled by the inviolable laws of demand and supply’.69 At 
some point, ignoring these ‘laws’ may become self-defeating. At the moment of submis- 
sion of this article, a court in the town of Pazin had just decreed to open insolvency 
proceedings for the Uljanik shipyard. 
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